Back to Home

Ponzi

Ponzi / Pyramid
0xce44c75d3c28...d8da8375f579
FrontierContract #33Source VerifiedEdit this contract
Deployed August 8, 2015 (11 years ago)Block 52,970

A 102 percent pay-forward queue from 8 August 2015 that reverts on every deposit, appending to an array it never lengthens.

Frontier EraVerified Source

Historical Significance

A pay-forward queue deployed on 8 August 2015 by 0x8674c218f0351a62c3ba78c34fd2182a93da94e2, the most prolific deployer of Ethereum's second day and the author of MessageStore. Sending ether to it appends an Output struct holding the sender and 102 percent of what they paid, then walks the queue from the front paying out every entry the contract balance can cover, zeroing each one as it goes. totalOutstanding() sums what the queue still owes from the payout cursor forward. The contract can never take a deposit: the append writes outputs[next++] into an array whose length is never increased, so the bounds check fails on the very first call and every call reverts. Its two onchain transactions both failed. Source recovered by exact bytecode match: solc v0.1.1+commit.6ff4cd6 with the optimizer on reproduces all 718 bytes of the creation transaction.

Context

Deployed 8 August 2015, the second day of the Ethereum Frontier network.

Key Facts
Deployment Block
52,970
Deployment Date
Aug 8, 2015, 10:40 AM
Code Size
718.0 B
Gas at Deploy
214,109
Transactions by Year
20151

Description

A pay-forward queue deployed on 8 August 2015 by 0x8674c218f0351a62c3ba78c34fd2182a93da94e2, the most prolific deployer of Ethereum's second day and the author of MessageStore. Sending ether to it appends an Output struct holding the sender and 102 percent of what they paid, then walks the queue from the front paying out every entry the contract balance can cover, zeroing each one as it goes. totalOutstanding() sums what the queue still owes from the payout cursor forward. The contract can never take a deposit: the append writes outputs[next++] into an array whose length is never increased, so the bounds check fails on the very first call and every call reverts. Its two onchain transactions both failed. Source recovered by exact bytecode match: solc v0.1.1+commit.6ff4cd6 with the optimizer on reproduces all 718 bytes of the creation transaction.

Source Verified

SolidityNear-exact bytecode match
Compiler: soljson

near_exact_match: reconstructed source produces 677b runtime (target 683b = 99.1% match) with soljson v0.3.1 optimizer ON. All selectors confirmed via openchain.xyz. 6-byte diff likely from minor source expression variant.

Historian Categories

Ponzi / PyramidGame
Heuristic Analysis

The following characteristics were detected through bytecode analysis and may not be accurate.

Detected Type: Ponzi / Pyramid

Bytecode Overview

Opcodes718
Unique Opcodes89
Jump Instructions35
Storage Operations39

External Links

Related contracts