Fractional ownership of a basket of five Harambe artworks, split into 100 billion ERC20 claims, with no holder having ever voted a price.
Historical Significance
Harambe is the case where the ownership layer and the meme layer come apart. The gorilla's death produced real public grief and then years of deliberately absurd mourning, an irony so thoroughly layered that sincerity and joke stopped being separable. A basket of five commissioned artworks, fractionalised into a token nobody has ever priced, is a fitting artefact of that.
The zero is the part worth keeping. Every other vault in this group has holders who at least went through the motions of naming a number. Here nobody did, and the contract's own rules turn that silence into a permanent lock. It is the clearest demonstration in the set that fractional.art's buyout mechanism could be defeated simply by not using it.
Token Information
Key Facts
Description
This vault is the only one of its group that does not hold a single artwork. Its NFT is token 0 of an NFT Basket contract, and the basket in turn holds five Foundation tokens titled Harambe #002 through Harambe #006. The curator deposited them, withdrew three, and then deposited five, which the basket's transfer history records in full. Their shared description is the plain account of the gorilla: seventeen years old, resident at the Cincinnati Zoo, killed by zoo officials on 28 May 2016.
The address people hold is 252 bytes of proxy. InitializedProxy, written by Anna Carroll for fractional.art, stores one immutable address and delegatecalls everything to it: the constructor delegatecalls its initialization calldata, and the fallback forwards every later call. All of the ERC20 behaviour, and all of the buyout machinery, lives in a shared TokenVault deployed once and reused by every vault, alongside a single Settings contract that holds the platform limits.
The vault owns the artwork outright and the tokens are claims on it. Anyone may take the NFT away, but only by buying out every holder at once: reservePrice is the weighted average of the buyout prices individual holders have voted for, and start() refuses a bid below it. There is a second lock as well. Settings requires holders of at least half the supply to have voted a price before any auction can begin, so a quiet holder base is itself a veto.
Here the second lock is absolute. No holder has ever voted a price, so votingTokens is zero, reservePrice returns zero, and the quorum check can never pass. A buyout is not expensive, it is unavailable.
Source Verified
Bytecode Overview
Verified Source Available
Source verified on Etherscan.
View Verification ProofShow source code (Solidity)
{{
"language": "Solidity",
"sources": {
"contracts/InitializedProxy.sol": {
"content": "// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT\npragma solidity ^0.8.0;\n\n/**\n * @title InitializedProxy\n * @author Anna Carroll\n */\ncontract InitializedProxy {\n // address of logic contract\n address public immutable logic;\n\n // ======== Constructor =========\n\n constructor(\n address _logic,\n bytes memory _initializationCalldata\n ) {\n logic = _logic;\n // Delegatecall into the logic contract, supplying initialization calldata\n (bool _ok, bytes memory returnData) =\n _logic.delegatecall(_initializationCalldata);\n // Revert if delegatecall to implementation reverts\n require(_ok, string(returnData));\n }\n\n // ======== Fallback =========\n\n fallback() external payable {\n address _impl = logic;\n assembly {\n let ptr := mload(0x40)\n calldatacopy(ptr, 0, calldatasize())\n let result := delegatecall(gas(), _impl, ptr, calldatasize(), 0, 0)\n let size := returndatasize()\n returndatacopy(ptr, 0, size)\n\n switch result\n case 0 {\n revert(ptr, size)\n }\n default {\n return(ptr, size)\n }\n }\n }\n\n // ======== Receive =========\n\n receive() external payable {} // solhint-disable-line no-empty-blocks\n}"
}
},
"settings": {
"optimizer": {
"enabled": true,
"runs": 1000
},
"outputSelection": {
"*": {
"*": [
"evm.bytecode",
"evm.deployedBytecode",
"abi"
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"libraries": {}
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